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REPLY ARGUMENT
POINTONE
The Supreme Court's dismissal "without prejudice" of the "Pasquin I"
appeal is dispositive of the issues raised by the Madsens in points 1,2,4,
5,6, and 7 of their brief and the Supreme Court should award damages
to the estate against the Madsens and/or their counsel for their failure to
disclose "existing law" adverse to their position to the Supreme Court.
"Pasquin I" was concluded by having the Supreme Court decide
whether thefirstappeal herein should be dismissed "without prejudice" as
was contended by the estate or "with prejudice" as was contended by the
Madsens. In urging the Supreme Court to dismiss "Pasquin I" with prejudice,
the Madsens raised or could have raised the same points they now raise in
points 2,4, 5,6, and 7 of their current brief. The Supreme Court rejected all
the Madsens' contentions and dismissed thefirstappeal "without" prejudice.
Thus, points 1,2,4, 5,6, and 7 were all previously decided on appeal.
Utah has effectively adopted a "pragmatic case-by-case approach to
finality in probate matters." In the Matter of Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d
1015 (Utah App. 1997) (Paragraph 4). The question of whether an order
entered during an ongoing probate isfinaland appealable turns on whether
the order "resolved an issue of vital importance" and "concluded a major
phase" in the probate. In re Estate of Christensen. 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982).
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The test that is applied to determine whether an order entered in an
ongoing probate is final and ripe for appeal is whether or not the "failure to
allow an appealfromsuch an order could compel all subsequent proceedings,
including partial distributions, to go forward under a cloud of uncertainty that
would seriously impair the personal representative's efforts to administer the
estate." In re Estate of Christensen. supra., (such as the order appealed in
"Pasquin I" in which the probate court awarded "half the estate to Karly
Madsen even though the Madsens had proffered no pleading or proof limiting
the children to two and there were, in fact, more than two children). Under
the "pragmatic" approach taken in Utah, it made sense to appeal that order,
since the claim by the Madsens to "half the estate was completely untenable
and the probate court's order granting them same needed to be subjected to
appellate review before the personal representative could prudently proceed
with the probate. But once a stipulation was reached that would allow an
amended order on that issue to be entered in the probate court, it made sense
under the "pragmatic" approach to have the first appeal dismissed "without
prejudice" so there could be some further proceedings in the probate court.
Using the "pragmatic" approach taken in Utah, the probate court once
again took jurisdiction after the dismissal of the appeal "without" prejudice.
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A subsequent "Amended Final Judgment" was then timely appealed.
Since the prior appeal was dismissed "without prejudice" and since the
"Amended Final Judgment" thereafter entered by the trial court is now before
this court on a timely appeal, this court has jurisdiction over the "Pasquin I"
issues dismissed "without prejudice" and over all new issues that since arose.
Under Utah's "pragmatic" approach, there was also no need to review
attorneys' fees on appeal until the Amended Final Judgment was entered and
appealed, since the probate court might well have modified its earlier award
based on the change in the operative facts of the case, reduction in the share
of the estate distributed to Karly Madsen, and because one matter in which
Karly Madsen had previously prevailed had now been completely reversed.
(One of the reasons remand is needed is to allow the trial court to enter
findings of fact showing why she did not modify the earlier fee award at all.)
To briefly review the "Pasquin I" appeal history, it should be noted
that a main issue involved the Madsens' contention that Karly Madsen was
entitled to "half of the estate. The estate had timely objected to that part of
the court'sfinaljudgment in the probate court since nothing had been pled by
Karly Madsen in her petition or proved by her at her trial to show that Kory
Pasquin had only two children. While "Pasquin I" was on appeal, the mother
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Kory Pasquin's third known child came forward and petitioned the probate
court to have her child recognized as a child and heir. In response, the estate
pointed out that such an eventuality was the very reason the estate had elected
to appeal the order awarding "half of the estate to Karly Madsen. In a most
predictable way, Karly Madsen formally opposed the petition of this third
child's mother. Even though her attorneys call her a "little girl" engaged in a
"four year battle to be recognized as the heir of her father" (Appellee's Brief,
P. 9), this "little girl" was more than happy to oppose the efforts, of another
child's mother once the shoe was suddenly on the other foot. Her overlydramatic self-misrepresentation as a little child victim involved in a battle is
hardly supported by the record. She has been fully recognized as an heir by
the estate for quite some time now, and the only matter that remains in dispute
is the fee and cost award of over $45,000 her lawyers want in a simple case
where there was already a DNA test in place before they were ever retained.
As a practical matter, all they had to do was either call a competent
foundational witness as to the existing DNA test or get a new court-ordered
DNA test, but elected to do neither and now want to get $41,212.50 in fees.
Judge Lewis declined to hear the petition of this third child's mother,
since the Madsen petition was on appeal. The stipulation for a dismissal
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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without prejudice ofthe'Tasquinl" appeal was then entered into. Karly
Madsen's position on appeal had become completely untenable even to her.
Since there was no pleading or proof that there were only two children,
and since the third child was already attempting to be recognized as an heir,
Karly Madsen was simply not going to be able to hang onto "half of the
estate on appeal and there was likely going to be a remand so that the claim
of the third child could be adjudicated in the probate court. "Pasquin I" was
thus dismissed without prejudice. The points now raised by the Madsens
concerning jurisdiction, the stipulation, and the various species of waiver and
estoppel were all raised by the Madsens and rejected by the Supreme Court in
"Pasquin I" and there is still no merit to the Madsens' contention that the
estate agreed to abandon anything dismissed "without prejudice" in "Pasquin
F' or that any species of waiver or estoppel somehow arose under this history.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Supreme Court's Rules of Professional Conduct
provides for "candor toward the tribunal" and required the Madsens' counsel
to duly "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and
not disclosed by opposing counsel." Counsel for the personal representative
did not disclose the decision in "Pasquin I" in the estate's opening brief for
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purposes of refuting the contentions now made by the Madsens in points 1, 2,
4, 5,6, and 7 of their current brief because the estate could not reasonably
have anticipated such a frivolous and meritless attempt to raise issues already
decided in the first appeal. Since it was the Madsens who raised points 1, 2,
4, 5,6, and 7, they should have disclosed in their brief both the fact that all of
these points were already raised by them and rejected by the Supreme Court
in "Pasquin I" and that the Supreme Court's order in "Pasquin I" is "existing
law" that controls these issues of law and is adverse to their clients' position.
The Supreme Court's dismissal order in "Pasquin I" was unpublished
and "unpublished orders" constitute existing law with "precedential value...
in the courts of this state... for purposes of applying the doctrine of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel." (CJA 4-508) And since the
Supreme Court's order in "Pasquin I" constitutes "existing law" as to this
case, the raising of points 1, 2,4, 5,6, and 7 coupled with the failure to make
the required disclosure of existing law contrary to the position taken renders
appellee's brief a "frivolous brief under URAP 33. It is not warranted by
"existing law" (the order entered in "Pasquin I" by the Supreme Court).
The estate requests appropriate damages under URAP 33 determined
after it is seen whether the Madsens now persist in points 1, 2,4, 5,6, and 7.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINTTWO
This appeal involves only the award of "attorney's fees and costs" to the
Madsens'attorneys. The status of Karly Madsen as a child of the late
Kory Pasquin IS NOT at issue. The claim made in appellees' brief that
"issues regarding paternity" are argued in addition to "attorney's fees
and costs" is frivolous. Damages should be awarded under URAP 33.
The two issues argued on appeal are (1) whether there is any statutory
basis for an attorney fee award in a paternity adjudication made for purposes
of intestate succession and (2) whether the fee and cost award is excessive.
The Madsens have made the false representation in their brief that the
estate "argues issues regarding paternity and the award of Karly's attorney's
fees and costs" on this appeal. (Brief of Appellees, P. 26, emphasis added).
The reasonableness of the fee and cost award in the context of probate
court paternity proceedings and lack of adequatefindingsof fact justifying the
large fee and cost award are argued in the estate's brief with some references
to what was actually done on in the probate court. But Karly Madsen's status
as a child of the late Kory Pasquin is not raised, disputed, or argued by the
estate. The Madsens' brief is "frivolous" under URAP 33 in that it makes a
material misrepresentation that is not "grounded in fact" herein. The estate
requests damages under URAP 33. The degree, nature, size, and scope of
sanctions should be determined after it is seen whether the Madsens persist in
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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their claim that the estate "argues issues regarding paternity . . . " or whether
they promptly concede that only "attorney's fees and costs" are at issue on
appeal with a court filing that corrects the false statement made in their brief.
The Madsens do correctly point out that the estate raised not only the
attorney fee award, but also $3,933.25 in costs awarded to Karly Madsen as
an appeal issue. The probate court already reduced costs claimed by Karly
Madsen by over $800 to get to the $3,933.25. The remaining $3,933.25 is
excessive. Since Kristie Madsen never named Kory Pasquin as the father in
the birth certificate during Kory Pasquin's lifetime, and since he had expressly
denied paternity during his lifetime even after the DNA test results had been
provided, the estate's reasonable position below was that a minimum amount
of foundational evidence and testimony should be introduced by the Madsens
at trial in order to have paternity facts decided by the jury, not by the personal
representative. Some witness fees are, thus, proper. But it appears that the
Madsens could have proceeded via a subpoena with a standard fact witness
fee, since DNA testing had already been purchased. If the testing providers
demanded payment beyond that, the court might have ordered payment to be
limited to necessary court time by witnesses previously paid to perform DNA
testing. A remand will allow for the entry of adequatefindingson all of this.
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT THREE
The Utah Uniform Probate Code contains no provision allowing
attorney's fees to be claimed as part of the costs in this case, but allows
only costs to be claimed. UCA Sec. 75-1-310 (1996) (R. 664)
Kristie Madsen did not name Kory Pasquin as the father of her child in
the birth certificate (R.29) either before or after his death. Nor did shefilea
paternity action against Kory Pasquin during his lifetime. After his death, she
still did notfilea paternity action against his estate seeking amounts accrued
prior to his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency. Instead,
she onlyfileda petition within the informal probate of his estate seeking to
establish a parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession only.
The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity in the Judicial Code provides:
78-45a-4. Limitations on recoveryfromfather's estate.
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities
under this act are limited to amounts accrued prior to
his death and such sums as may be payable for dependency under other laws. UCA Sec. 78-45a-4 (2001)
The sole statute cited by appellees in the probate court and in point 3
of their brief in support of an attorney fee award is UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4).
That statute does not apply to intestate succession because it is part of
the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, it is not part of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code, and the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity comes into play only because
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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UCA Sec. 75-2-114 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code now makes reference
generally to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity and expressly to the genetic
testing provisions therein and states that the "parent child relationship may be
established as provided" therein. Establishing a parent-child relationship
i

under the Utah Uniform Probate Code for purposes of intestate succession is
very distinctfroma paternity action. Under intestate succession in Utah, a
parent can inherit by intestate successionfroma deceased child. A living
child could inherit under intestate successionfromhis or her deceased
parent's ancestors. In all such cases, the reference to the Utah Uniform Act
on Paternity appearing in the Utah Uniform Probate Code at UCA Sec. 75-2114 means the parent-child issue may be resolved using genetic testing under
the procedures set forth in Title 78, Chapter 45a, but it does not mean that the
parent of a deceased child could collect support or attorney's fees under the
Utah Uniform Act on Paternityfromthe deceased child's estate or that a child
of a deceased parent could collect support or attorney's feesfroma parent's
ancestor's estate any more than Karly Madsen can now use the Utah Uniform
Act on Paternity as a vehicle for recovering attorney's fees in this probate.
The issue of Karly Madsen's status as a biological child of the late
Kory Pasquin was adjudicated for intestate succession purposes only. The
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reference in the Utah Uniform Probate Code to the genetic testing chapters in
the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity contains no attorney fee award language.
And if Karly Madsen were to now bring a paternity action against the
estate for child support liabilities under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity
and it did not violate the time for bringing such an action under the applicable
statute of limitations, the case would still be limited by UCA Sec. 78-45a-4.
It is also important to recognize even in a paternity case against a living
father where fees are awardable under UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4), which is the
sole attorney's fee statute relied upon by appellees below and in their point 3
here, the fee award is not mandatory, but is discretionary and very limited.
UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4) states as follows:
78-45a-5. Remedies. (4). The court may enter an order
awarding costs, attorney fees, and witness fees in the
manner prescribed by Section 30-3-3 upon a judgment or
acknowledgement of paternity. UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4) (2001)
By referencing Section 30-3-3 (divorce), the Utah Uniform Act on
Paternity brings to bear divorce attorney fee law, meaning attorney's fees
under the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity are in substance a form of support
and alimony (subject to the same analysis offinancialneed, ability to pay, and
the incomes of living parents as is applied to a support and alimony analysis.)
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, such a fee award does not fit into intestate succession at all.
If the inheritance were a large one, then there would be no need on the
part of the recipient heir, because the heir could pay a reasonable attorney's
fee out of the inheritance. (And the estate would lack the ability to pay
because it would be an empty vessel after inheritances are distributed.)
If the inheritance were a small one, then there would not be any
justification in running up a large attorney's fee (like the one in this case),
since the "amount involved" would make a large attorney fee unreasonable.
The legal issue before the Supreme Court is, thus, whether an heir who
has utilized genetic testing for purposes of establishing paternity for purposes
of intestate succession under Utah Uniform Probate Code at UCA Sec. 75-2114 can recover attorneys fees from the estate under UCA Sec. 78-45a-5(4).
It does not appear that any litigants other than the Madsens have tried
to make the argument on appeal that it does provide such a basis under Utah
statutes, and so this does present a question of first impression on this appeal.
The Supreme Court should hold that the reference made in the Utah
Uniform Probate Code at UCA Sec. 75-2-114 to the Utah Uniform Act on
Paternity at Chapter 45a, Title 78, of the Utah Code does refer to the genetic
testing procedures therein but does not provide for the award of attorney fees.
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT FOUR
In reply to the contentions in points 8 and 9 of the Madsens'
brief, thefindingsof fact and conclusions of law of record require
reversal and remand to satisfy the Estate ofOuinn requirements.
The foregoing Point One through Point Three in this brief fully
reply to points 1 though 7 of the Madsens' brief. Both Point 8 and
Point 9 of the Madsen brief are hereby given a reply in this Point Four.
Consistent with the "pragmatic" approach taken to finality of
orders in probate matters, it is vitally important to have the Supreme
Court now decide whether there is a statutory basis for a fee award.
If there is no such basis, then that will conclude that matter.
If there is one, then "pragmatic" considerations would make it
helpful for the Supreme Court to reverse and remand with instructions
to the probate court to wait on awarding any attorneys' fees until the
probate nears conclusion and an assessment can be made under the
Estate of Ouinn principles set forth in the estate's opening brief of the
reasonableness of the fee in light of the value of inheritance thereby
secured for Karly Madsen after administrative and other claims with
priority are first paid and such an actual value can then be assessed and
measured. None of that can yet be assessed or measured by the courts.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The personal representative, the Madsens, and the courts lack
the clairvoyance and the prescience needed to assess and measure what
the value of any inheritances will be, because one property interest is
still tied-up in litigation between third parties. (R.356) The late Kory
Pasquin owned a partnership interest. Any payment from the surviving
partners) in conjunction with an accounting for his partnership interest
by the surviving partner or partners will not be received by the estate
until litigation between third parties over that partnership has ended.
Thus, whether or not $41,212.50 can be justified by the "amount
involved" and the "results obtained" cannot yet be determined because
that portion of the inheritance distribution is uncertain and unknowable.
The "pragmatic" considerations in Utah law that govern whether
to consider a matter on appeal or to send it back to the probate court
where it can be revisited by the probate court, if necessary, strongly
favor a remand. In doing so, the Supreme Court should instruct the
probate court it is not precludedfromrevisiting matters so sent back to
it "without prejudice" when there has been a change in the operative
facts and/or where facts previously unknown and unknowable have
become known. This will help promote orderly estate administration.
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINTFIVE
In further reply to the contentions in points 8 and 9 of the
Madsens' brief, the estate preserved all issues raised on appeal.
The estate timely informed the probate court of its position that
the proposed order awarding some $45,000 in attorney's fees and costs
should be "rejected and not signed." (R.657) Had the court done what
the estate asked, deficiencies concerning lack of findings of fact and
conclusions of law would not have arisen in the probate court. Since
the court did sign the order over the estate's objection, the estate may
now raise on appeal all of the errors that were made by the probate
court as a consequence of that signing over the estate's objection,
including the lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law supporting
either the $41,212,50 attorney fee award or the $3,933.25 cost award.
In another timely filing well before the court signed the order,
the estate pointed out its position that $41,212.50 in this "simple case"
appeared "excessive" and an "assistant attorney general working the
paternity calendar for recovery services could likely prepare such a
case in an afternoon and try it in less than a day" since DNA testing
was done before the Madsens' attorneys were retained and when the
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Madsens' attorneys requested the test results "the estate stipulated the
(DNA) tests could be released and the court so ordered." (R.665)
The absence of conclusions of law (particularly as they relate to
the absence of a statutory basis for the attorney fee award) was also
preserved when the estate timely objected to the order well in advance
of signing by riling the following objection to the attorney fee portion:
"The Utah Uniform Probate Code contains no provision allowing
attorney's fees to be claimed as part of the costs in this case, but allows
only costs to be claimed. UCA Sec. 75-1-310 (1996)." (R.664)
The need for adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as
to the $3,933.25 cost award was also timely raised and preserved when
the estate objected to the claimed costs in the probate court as follows:
"(C)osts were not recoverable at common law and are generally
allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided by statute.
Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980V The'expert witness'
testified that he was a custodian of state DNA testing records at the
University of Utah and, therefore, as a records custodian, he could and
should have been paid only the statutory witness fee. Further, the
genetic testing statute in effect on the date of Kory Pasquin's death
specifically provides that '(t)he fee of an expert witness called by a
party but not appointed by the court shall not be taxed as costs in the
action (emphasis added)' UCA Sec. 78-45a-9 (1996)." (R.664-665)
All appeal issues were raised and preserved below and should be
heard on appeal under the "pragmatic approach" used in Utah probate.
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT SIX
In reply to the contentions in points 9 and 10 of the Madsens'
brief, Estate ofOuinn requires entry of a finding of fact stating an
approximate amount of Karly Madsen's inheritance. The lack of
any pragmatic perspective on the part of the Madsens and their
counsel as to the relationship between attorney fees and costs and
the amount of her inheritance is not a basis for an excessive award.
The essence of the Madsens' arguments in points 9 and 10 of
their brief is that the findings required under Matter of Estate of Ouinn.
830 P.2d 282 (Ut. App. 1992), are "inherent" in the trial court's order.
However, since even the approximate amount of Karly Madsen's
inheritance is unknown and unknowable at this stage of the probate due
to third-party litigation, it cannot yet be "inherent" in the court's order.
Until it can be approximated, Estate of Ouinn cannot be applied.
The Madsens and their counsel increased fees and costs by more
than $40,000 over the $5000 that would be reasonable based on this:
"Karly was required to incur substantially more in legal fees because
the Estate has employed an endless series of complex legal tactics that
constitute conduct perhaps exceeded only by that of the poisoning
princes of the Medici family of Renaissance Italy."(Aplee. Brief p. 32)
The failure to connect this subjective perspective on their part
with the amount of Karly Madsen's inheritance makes this insufficient.
This argument does not satisfy the Estate of Ouinn requirements.
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Furthermore, even though it is the subjective claim of the Madsens and
their counsel that this probate is a difficult one for them, the record shows no
independent attempt by the probate court to characterize the fee as reasonable
in light of any "endless" or "complex" legal tactics.1 This case is comparable
to Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684 (Ut.App. 1990). Even though a lawyer
characterized the fees as reasonable in light of the difficulty of the case, the
absence of an "an independent attempt by the court" to so characterize the
fees required a remand for "reconsideration of the award of fees and for entry
of such additional findings as may be necessary" and as to the costs awarded:
"(W)itness fees, travel expenses, and service of process expenses are
chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute ."...
"Witness compensation in excess of the statutory schedule is generally
inappropriate as a cost."... (Payments to witnesses in excess of the statutory
schedule amounts do not constitute) "legitimate and taxable 'costs'" (but are)
"expenses"..."which may be ever so necessary, but are not taxable as costs."
Thus, the attorney fee and cost award in this case should be reversed
and remanded for "reconsideration of the award of fees" and costs "and for
entry of such additional findings as may be necessary." The Supreme Court
should also include a mandate directing the trial court to limit witness costs to
only statutory witness fees, travel expenses, and subpoena service expenses.

1

It should be noted that the Medici princes were responsible for fostering a very great
flowering of the arts in Florence and also had the good sense to fire and jail the amoral
leadership guru Machiavelli. If the personal representative's counsel's stamina and skill
enabled him to employ endless and complex legal tactics comparable to those employed
by historic personages, that is no small thing. However, since the trial court made no
such finding, it appears the Madsens and their counsel are employing overdramatization
in this matter. Further, since any such legal tactics successfully fended-off very vexatious
litigation by the Madsens (such as their attempts to pursue discovery into the sex life of
the estate's personal representative), it was good any such tactics were successfully used.
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As set forth earlier in this brief, there is no provision for an attorney
fee award in the probate code when the parent-child relationship is pled in a
petition filed within an informal probate and is then adjudicated for intestate
succession purposes only. The reference to the genetic testing and other
provisions of Chapter 45 a of Title 78 could be used to establish intestate
succession from a child to a parent orfroma parent's ancestor to a child just
as easily as it could be used as a basis for parent to child intestate succession.
Further, recovery from a father's estate is limited even in a paternity
action. The court should hold there is no statutory basis for a fee award.
In the event that the court holds that the reference to Chapter 45a of
Title 78 incorporates more than just the genetic testing and other paternity
establishment procedures therein, and incorporates the attorney fee provision
therein, then the Chapter 45a reference to UCA Sec. 30-3-3 when stating the
manner in which attorney's fees may be awarded would come into play. In
that case, the court's failure to makefindingsof fact concerning the attorney
fee award's reasonableness as required under Estate of Quinn also runs afoul
of the cases which require findings of fact under Sec. 30-3-3 fee award cases.
Under those cases, the court must makefindingsof fact concerning the
receiving party's need, the paying party's ability to pay, the reasonableness of
the fee, and the subsidiary "earned income ratios" of the parties against which
such determinations are made. Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (Ut.App. 1998).
While "earned income ratios" are not a very good fit in a probate, it is
clear that Sec. 30-3-3 would at least require a specificfindingof fact as to the
amount of Karly Madsen's inheritance on which to base need, ability to pay,
and reasonableness. Reversal and remand are required under Sec. 30-3-3 so
the trial court can do a Sec. 30-3-3 analysis based on the inheritance amount.
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Another Madsen argument that warrants a brief reply is the raw
comparison between their fee and cost claim of over $45,000 with some
$40,000 in fees and costs allegedly incurred by the personal representative.
The Madsens refer to both numbers and then claim it is "ludicrous" for
the estate to even question their fees and costs. In so doing, the Madsens are
engaging in a written equivalent of raising one's voice rather than improving
the quality of one's arguments, since the record shows that the personal
representative had to retain legal counsel for a number of other legal matters.2
The raw comparison is, thus, pointless, meaningless, and gratuitous.
2

The fatal accident in which Kory Pasquin was allegedly operating a speedboat while
intoxicated also caused serious personal injuries to his passenger, who asserted a formal
claim against the estate. Counsel for the personal representative successfully defended
the estate in a manner that caused the claim to be withdrawn. A lawsuit was filed against
the estate asserting a claim to one-third of shares of stock that had been owned by Kory
Pasquin. The personal representative had her counsel secure summary judgment in favor
the estate. An attempt by the losing party to perfect an appeal was not successful and the
Utah Court of Appeals declined to set aside the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of the estate. An attempt by the losing party to then have the Utah Supreme Court take
the case was denied. Geri Pasquin v. Estate of Kory Pasquin, et aL cert denied. January
26,2000, Utah Supreme Court Docket No. 990823. The subject shares have now been
distributed to the three children identified as heirs so far, subject to rights retained by the
estate in the event they are needed to satisfy superior claims or to satisfy claims of equal
priority on a pro rata basis. It should be noted that the same lawsuit also still seeks a
portion of a partnership interest Kory Pasquin owned and is still pending between third
parties. Although the estate is no longer a party, future payment to the estate for Kory
Pasquin's partnership interest by the surviving partner or partners cannot be computed or
paid to the estate until that litigation is concluded. The final amount of Karly Madsen's
inheritance is, therefore, both unknown and unknowable. These and other matters caused
the personal representative to reasonably incur legal fees beyond those incurred due to
Kristie Madsen's petition to have Karly Madsen adjudicated to be a an heir. The personal
representative has not yet sought any reimbursement out of estate property for the legal
fees and costs she has incurred in performing her duties. Raw comparison between the
Madsens' legal fees for a single matter (where their initial success in getting "half1 of the
estate was eventually reversed) with the personal representative's legal fees for a number
of additional matters (in which the estate fully prevailed) does not advance the analysis.
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The Madsens' brief then lists various criteria that the courts should use
in evaluating the reasonableness of a fee and asserts that the probate court
must have used these, even though no such evaluation process by the court is
even minimally revealed in the probate court's fee and cost order.
The probate court would have been unable to reasonably assess either
the amount involved in the case or the result achieved because the amount of
Karly Madsen's inheritance was and is still unknown and unknowable.
It was an abuse of discretion for the probate court to attempt to assess
the reasonableness of the fees and costs without first determining the amount
of Karly Madsen's inheritance so that this could be used as a yardstick.
POINTSEVEN
The sudden appearance of Yvettte Madsen as a party on appellees' brief
is simply another example of how this case was made difficult not by
any complex legal tactics on the part of the estate, but by the Madsens'
counsel's utter failure to distinguish between an informal probate and a
civil lawsuit in their court filings and their use of the informal probate
as a repository for all kinds of filings wholly unrelated to paternity.
Kory Pasquin had denied paternity as to Karly Madsen during his
lifetime, even after DNA test results were obtained. Since Kristie Madsen
never named Kory Pasquin as Karly Madsen's father on Karly Madsen's birth
certificate, and since, even after obtaining some DNA test results, she never
obtained either an adjudication of paternity or a court-approved agreement of
paternity as required under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, the personal
representative properly excluded Karly Madsen as a child and heir in the
initial informal probate filings. This was both legally correct and prudent. A
DNA test result is not a valid substitute for a birth certificate or a court order.
-21-
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Yet, instead of simply filing and litigating a proceeding to establish
Karly Madsen's legal status as a child and heir, Kristie Madsen started off
right out of the chute by adding filings that called Candance M. Souter a liar
for not including Karly Madsen as a child and heir of Kory Pasquin in the
initial informal probate filing. Kristie Madsen's attorneys then proceeded to
use the informal probate case file as a repository for various and sundry
petitions and affidavits from the likes of Geri Pasquin and Julie Flarity which
also did nothing to move the threshold issue of paternity forward, but instead
continued to attack Candance M. Souter about her informal application for
appointment, which they claimed was "false" for not naming Karly Madsen
as a child and heir and with more unkind allegations that they did not support
with anything concrete. Even though she is not a party below, yet another
Madsen has now emerged on appeal claiming to be a party and to speak for
the minor child Karly Madsen and has proceeded where the others left-off
with allegations of "endless" and "complex" legal tactics by Ms. Souter.
An informal probate is not an open-ended repository for thefilingof
anything and everything. It is also not a civil lawsuit. Normally, one must
proceed therein by petition, not by motion. If a legal dispute arises within the
probate between parties with standing therein, it is then resolved according to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as between the parties with standing, and
is not an open file for the filing of papers by anyone who cares to come along
andfilesomething. Instead of simply focusing on the very simple threshold
question of paternity after the filing of Kristie Madsens' petition on that point,
Kristie Madsen's attorneys continued to beat this worn drum well into the
next year. On October 30, 1998, an attorney for Kristie Madsen (who then
inexplicably claimed to represent only Julie Flarity and Karly Madsen, but
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not Kristie Madsen) told a Third District Judge that some as yet unidentified
"we" were still complaining about same: "We have serious concerns about
representations she made to the Court in her informal application for
appointment, which we think are false." (T.4, October 30, 1998 hearing.)
The judge gently reminded counsel that the first order of business was
to resolve the threshold question of paternity to establish some standing and
that Karly Madsen had not yet been legally adjudicated to be a child and heir.
To the extent that the spectacle of having persons claiming to speak for
"little" Karly Madsen shuffle in and out of this case in the probate court and
on appeal has increased her attorney's fees, it is not reasonable to require the
estate to pay them. To the extent that parties who are before the court for the
purpose of establishing paternity want to spend their attorney time beating
their drum well into the next year about "serious concerns" they have based
on their belief that it was "false" for the personal representative to decline to
include in her initial probate filing someone who did not appear as a child of
Kory Pasquin on any official birth record or in any court adjudication, the
estate should not have to pay for the attorney time they spent on this pursuit.
Since the probate court awarded every last dime of attorneys' fees
requested, and since that request culled-out only the time spent on Julie
Flarity's non-paternity filings and activities, but not on the non-paternity
filings and activities unrelated to Julie Flarity, a remand is now required to
allow the probate court to cull-out all attorney time unrelated to paternity.
Only those filings and activities by lawyers that moved the issue of
paternity towards a legal conclusion should be included in any fee award,
and, as set forth previously in this brief, that should happen only if the
appellate court concludes that an attorney fee award has a statutory basis.
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POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY HER OWN
ORDER AS TO FEES AND COSTS AND INAPPROPRIATE
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "LAW OF THE CASE"
WHERE THE OPERATIVE FACTS HAD CHANGED PRECLUDES
THE APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL SOUGHT BY THE MADSENS.
In further reply to the Madsens' arguments in their brief concerning
various forms of estoppel, after "Pasquin I" was duly dismissed without
prejudice, the probate court proceeded by reassuming jurisdiction and by
promptly entering an order indicating that issues regarding attorney fees and
costs were yet to be briefed and argued to her. Thereafter, at the urging of
the Madsens, she improperly vacated that order and reinstated the earlier
attorney fee order appealed in "Pasquin I" (dismissed without prejudice).
Since the operative facts had changed (the Madsens had given-up on
the untenable award of "half of the estate to Karly Madsen), it was error to
reinstate the prior fee and cost award without entering new findings of fact
and conclusions of law justifying the failure to make a new attorney fee and
cost award. Just as court action on attorney fees requires entry of findings of
fact and conclusions of law, inaction (such as the failure to reconsider after a
change in operative facts) also requiresfindingsof fact and conclusions of
law. For example, when a court declines to make an attorney fee award and
requires each side to bear its costs and attorney fees, the court must make
findings of fact to justify this. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Ut.App. 1998)
Once "Pasquin I" was dismissed without prejudice, Karly Madsen
faced one of two outcomes: (1) Additional (court-ordered) DNA testing
would establish paternity as to both Karly Madsen and Kody Marion (which
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it did); (2) Additional court-ordered DNA testing would exclude paternity as
to Kody Marion, which would leave Karly Madsen still exposed to appellate
review of her failure to call as a foundation witness at trial a "lab technician...
to...testify as to the chain of custody of the blood samples drawn ..." State
Dept. of Social Services v, Woods, 742 P.2d 118 (UtApp. 1987) In either
case, her claim to "half the estate could no longer stand unless and until the
claims of any other children (and any women claiming to be married to Kory
Pasquin who might also come forward) were barred. Accordingly, the
probate court should never have vacated the order wherein she indicated she
would look at attorney fees after the "Pasquin I" dismissal, and there simply
is no basis under this record for imposing any kind of appellate estoppel.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should hold that it was an abuse of discretion for
the probate court to review the attorney fee and cost claim for reasonableness
without first finding and expressly stating the approximate amount of Karly
Madsen's inheritance, it should hold that the probate court's findings of fact
are inadequate to facilitate appellate review, it should hold that witness costs
should be limited to statutory service of subpoena, mileage, and witness fees,
it should hold there is no statutory basis for an attorney fee award, it should
then reverse and remand the entire fee and cost award, it should also award
costs, and it should awaj^3amages to tne estate in a sufficiently large sumT^
DATED THIS OTH DAY ©F JULY, 2001.

NtQBEWartOPIER
Attorne^for Candance M. Souter
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
True copies of the foregoing were mailed to:
David W. Steffensen
Attorney for Karly Madsen and Yvette Madsen
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100, SLC UT 84106
Michael E. Day
Attorney for Sheri Marion
45 East Vine Street, Murray/OT 84107
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